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Incentive Mechanism Design for Wireless Energy
Harvesting-Based Internet of Things
Zhanwei Hou, He Chen, Yonghui Li, and Branka Vucetic
Abstract—Radio frequency energy harvesting (RFEH) is a
promising technology to charge unattended Internet of Things
(IoT) low-power devices remotely. To enable this, in future IoT
system, besides the traditional data access points (DAPs) for
collecting data, energy access points (EAPs) should be deployed
to charge IoT devices to maintain their sustainable operations.
Practically, the DAPs and EAPs may be operated by different
operators, and the DAPs thus need to provide effective incentives
to motivate the surrounding EAPs to charge their associated IoT
devices. Different from existing incentive schemes, we consider
a practical scenario with asymmetric information, where the
DAP is not aware of the channel conditions and energy costs
of the EAPs. We first extend the existing Stackelberg game-
based approach with complete information to the asymmetric
information scenario, where the expected utility of the DAP is
defined and maximized. To deal with asymmetric information
more efficiently, we then develop a contract theory-based frame-
work, where the optimal contract is derived to maximize the
DAP’s expected utility as well as the social welfare. Simulations
show that information asymmetry leads to severe performance
degradation for the Stackelberg game-based framework, while
the proposed contract theory-based approach using asymmetric
information outperforms the Stackelberg game-based method
with complete information. This reveals that the performance of
the considered system depends largely on the market structure
(i.e., whether the EAPs are allowed to optimize their received
power at the IoT devices with full freedom or not) than on
the information availability (i.e., the complete or asymmetric
information).
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Wireless energy harvesting,
Stackelberg game, contract theory, incentive mechanism
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
By connecting objects, physical devices, vehicles, animals
and other items to the Internet, Internet of Things (IoT) has
emerged as a new paradigm to enable ubiquitous and pervasive
communications [1]–[3]. Wireless sensing service is one of the
fundamental applications of IoT, which enables systems and
users to continuously monitor ambient environment [4].
One of the major hurdles for implementing the wireless
sensing application is the limited lifetime of traditional battery-
powered sensors, which are costly and hard to maintain [5],
[6]. For example, frequent recharging or battery replacement is
inconvenient in deserts or remote areas, and is even impossible
for some scenarios, such as toxic environment or implanted
medical applications [7]. To tackle this problem, radio fre-
quency energy harvesting (RFEH) has recently been proposed
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as an attractive technology to prolong the operational lifetime
of sensors, enhance the deployment flexibility, and reduce the
maintenance costs [7], [8].
In this paper, we consider a radio frequency energy har-
vesting based IoT system consisting of a data access point
(DAP) and several energy access points (EAPs). The DAP
collects information from its associated sensors. EAPs can
provide wireless charging services to sensors via the RF
energy transfer technique. The sensors are assumed to have
no embedded energy supply, but they can harvest energy from
radio frequency (RF) signals radiated by the surrounding EAPs
to transmit the data to the DAP [9].
There are some research considering the deployment of
dedicated EAPs in the existing cellular network, such that
the upgraded network can provide both wireless access and
wireless charging services [10]–[17]. However, it was assumed
that the EAPs are deployed by the same operator of the
existing network. In practice, the DAP and EAPs may be
operated by different operators1. To effectively motivate these
third-party and self-interested EAPs to help charge the sensors,
effective incentive mechanisms are required to improve the
payoff of the DAP as well as those of EAPs. While there are
several initial work designing the incentive mechanism [18]–
[20] for the EAPs belonging to different operators, complete
information was considered in these schemes. Specifically, it
was assumed that the EAPs will truthfully report their private
information to the DAP, e.g., their energy costs and channel
gains between EAPs and sensors. This happens when there
exists a supervising entity in the network, which is capable of
monitoring and sharing all behaviours and network conditions
of the DAP and EAPs to ensure that they always report
the trustful information. However, without such a supervising
entity, EAPs’ private information might be not aware to the
DAP, which is normally called information asymmetry in
the literature [21]. A rational EAP may provide misleading
information maliciously and pretend to be an EAP with better
channel condition and/or higher energy cost to cheat for more
rewards. A malicious EAP can succeed in cheating to get more
benefits because of information asymmetry in the RF energy
trading process.
To address above issues, in this paper we will design
effective incentive mechanisms to maximize the utilities of the
DAP and EAPs under scenarios with asymmetric information.
1This could happen when a resource-limited operator cannot provide radio
frequency energy charging service in some certain area due to limited budgets,
or lack of site locations, or lack of licensed spectrum for energy harvesting.
Therefore, it has to resort to third-party operators.
2To this end, the following important questions should be
addressed under asymmetric information:
Which EAPs the DAP should hire, how much energy should
be requested from the hired EAPs, and how many rewards
should be given to the hired EAPs?
The above questions are non-trivial to answer because the
hierarchical interactions between multiple parities should be
modeled and analyzed: the cooperations between the DAP,
the DAP’s sensors and the EAPs, and the competition among
EAPs with heterogeneous private information. Moreover, the
information asymmetry make the problem even more challeng-
ing, because it is difficult for the DAP to hire the effective
EAPs without knowing EAPs’ private information, such as
energy costs and channel condition towards its sensors.
B. Solution and Contribution
To answer the above questions, we apply the well-
established economic theories to model the conflicted interests
among the multiple parities in the considered RFEH-based IoT
system. Specifically, we first extend the existing Stackelberg
game-based approach with complete information to the con-
sidered case with asymmetric information, such that we can
evaluate the performance degradation caused by information
asymmetry to this approach. More specifically, due to lack of
the complete information, the expected utility function of the
DAP is defined and optimized in the Stackelberg game with
asymmetric information. Considering that contract theory is a
powerful tool originated from economics to deal with infor-
mation asymmetry in a monopoly market, we apply contract
theory to develop an optimal contract to effectively motivate
the EAPs under asymmetric information. In our contract, the
RF energy trading market is analogous as a monopoly labor
market in economics. The DAP is modeled as the employer
who offers a contract to each EAP. The contract is composed
of a serious of contract items, which are combinations of
energy-reward pairs. Each contract item is an agreement
about how many rewards an EAP will get by contributing a
certain amount of RF energy. Various heterogeneous EAPs are
classified into different types according to their energy costs
and instantaneous channel conditions. The EAPs are regarded
as labors in the market, which will choose a contract item best
meeting their interests. By properly designing the contract, an
EAP’s type will be revealed through its selection. Thus the
DAP can capture each EAP’s private information to a certain
extent and thus relieve the issue of information asymmetry.
To the best knowledge, this is the first paper that systemat-
ically studies the RFEH-based IoT system under asymmetric
information. The main contributions of this paper are summa-
rized as follows.
• We develop the framework of RF energy trading in
the RFEH-based IoT system and systematically design
the incentive mechanisms for a practical scenario with
asymmetric information.
• To explore the performance degradtion due to lack of
full information, we first extend the existing Stackelberg
game-based approach to the considered case without
instantaneous channel condition and energy costs of the
EAPs by optimizing the expected utility function of the
DAP. As contract theory is a powerful economic theory
for designing incentive mechanism with asymmetric in-
formation. We then reformulate the problem by using
contract theory. In our contract design, we characterize
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the contract
feasibility, i.e, individual rationality (IR) conditions and
incentive capability (IC) conditions [21]. Subject to the
IR and IC constraints, the optimal contract under infor-
mation asymmetry is achieved by maximizing the DAP’s
expected utility as well as the social welfare.
• To compare the performance of the proposed contract
theory-based approach using asymmetric information
with that of the existing Stackelberg game-based method
with complete information, we generalize the existing
Stackelberg game formation with unified pricing to the
case with discriminative pricing and derive the new Stack-
elberg equilibrium in closed-form. Here discriminative
pricing means that we set different energy prices for dif-
ferent EAPs to fully exploit their potentials for the enery
charging service. Numerical simulation results show that
information asymmetry can lead to severe performance
degradation for the Stackelberg game-based framework,
while the proposed contract theory-based scheme us-
ing asymmetric information outperforms the Stackleberg
game-based approach with complete information. This
implies that the performance of the considered system
depends largely on the market structure (i.e., whether the
EAPs are allowed to optimize their received power at
the IoT devices with full freedom or not) than on the
information availability (i.e., the complete or asymmetric
information).
Note that part of the work was presented in our previous
conference paper [22]. In this journal version, we extend our
previous work by considering both scenarios of complete in-
formation and asymmetric information and explore the impacts
of information availability and market structure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we review the related literature. The system model is pre-
sented in Section III. The incentive mechanisms in asymmetric
information in complete information are proposed in Section
IV. The benchmark schemes are elaborated in Section V.
Numerical results are presented in Section VI, and conclusions
are drawn in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. EAP assisted Wireless Energy Harvesting
The idea of deploying a dedicated wireless energy network,
that can provide wireless charging service to the terminals by
using RFEH technology, was originally proposed by Huang
et al. [10], [11]. The dedicated power transmitters are called
power beacons or EAPs. Using stochastic geometry, the trade-
off between the densities of the base stations and EAPs was
analyzed in [10]. There are many works exploiting EAPs to
enable services of both wireless information and energy access
in existing cellular networks [12]–[17]. Stochastic geometry
was used to analyze the network performance with the EAPs
3in [12]–[14]. In [15], beamforming was introduced in the EAPs
assisted cellular network to reduce the interference resulting
from the EAPs. Leveraging finite-length information theory,
the system performance in the finite blocklength regime was
analyzed in [16]. The security issue with EAP in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper was investigated in [17]. In all
above works, the DAP and EAPs are assumed to belong to
the same operator. In such a network, the devices belonging
to the same operator with extra energy were assumed to
voluntarily assist other devices. However, in practice, the
DAP and EAPs may be operated by different operators. To
successfully motivate self-interested EAPs to provide help,
effective incentive mechanisms are required. There are several
prior research works in designing the incentive mechanism
[18]–[20] for the EAPs, where [18], [19] adopted Stackelberg
game and [20] used auction to design the incentive mechanism.
However, the existing incentive mechanisms only considered
complete information scenario.
B. Contract Theory
The contract theory has been employed to address incentive
design problems in wireless communication areas, such as
mobile edge computing [23], device-to-device (D2D) com-
munications [24] and cooperative spectrum sharing [25]. To
the best knowledge of the authors, we are the first to apply
contract theory in the RF energy trading process in RFEH-
based IoT systems. To design the incentive mechanism in such
a scenario is challenging because the DAP needs to choose and
reward the most efficient EAPs without knowing their channel
conditions and energy costs.
C. Stackelberg Game
Stackelberg game has been widely used in wireless commu-
nications to model the interactions of steatitic parties, such as
physical layer security [26], resource management for LTE-
unlicensed [27], cognitive radio [28] and wireless energy
harvesting [18], [19], [29]–[31]. In [29], the authors considered
cooperative spectrum sharing with one primary user (PU) and
one secondary user (SU), which harvests energy from ambient
radio signal. The Stackelberg game was used to design the
the SU’s optimal cooperation strategy. In [30], simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) in relay
interference channels was considered, where multiple source-
destination pairs communicate through their dedicated energy
harvesting relays. The optimal power splitting ratios for all
relays were derived by the formulated Stackelberg game. In
[31], the authors formulated a stochastic Stackelberg game to
study the delay optimal power allocation scheme. There is
a recent paper addressing the EAP assisted wireless energy
harvesting by using Stackelberg game [19], but their system
settings are different from those in our work. Only one EAP
with multiple antennas was considered in this paper, and
the EAP acts as the seller and the base station (BS) as the
buyer in behalf of its sensors. A more relevant work is [18],
where an incentive mechanism was designed for the system
with the similar setup where monetary reward with unified
pricing were provided by the DAP to motivate third-party
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Fig. 1: System model for the radio frequency energy harvesting
assisted Internet of Things network
EAPs to assist the charging process. Here the unified pricing
means prices per unit energy for different EAPs are the same.
However, in this paper, we consider discriminative pricing
scheme of Stackelberg game for the heterogenous EAPs in our
work, including unified pricing scheme as a special case. Here
discriminative pricing means that we set different energy prices
for different EAPs to fully exploit their potentials for the enery
charging service. Moreover, we extend the Stackelberg game
to asymmetric information scenario by optimizing expected
utility function of the DAP, instead of optimizing instantaneous
utility function of the DAP in the classical Stackelberg game.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a wireless energy harvesting-based IoT system
consisting of one DAP and N EAPs belonging to different
operators, which are connected to constant power supplies and
connected to the server by backhauls, as shown in Fig. 1. The
DAP is responsible for collecting various data from several
wireless-powered sensors within its serving region. Without
embedded energy supplies, the wireless-powered sensors fully
rely on the energy harvested from the RF signals emitted by
the EAPs to transmit its information to the DAP. For simplicity,
we consider that the RF energy transfer and information
transmission are performed over orthogonal bandwidth. For
analytical tractability, time division-based transmission among
sensors is adopted, i.e., there is only one active sensor during
each transmission block. Hereafter, we refer to this active
sensor as the information source. Besides, all the nodes in
the system are assumed to be equipped with single antenna
and operate in the half-duplex mode.
We consider that the energy-carrying signals sent by the
EAPs are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) ran-
dom variables with zero mean and unit variance. Note that no
coordination between the EAPs is needed since independent
signals are transmitted. All channels are assumed to experience
independent slow and flat fading, where the channel gains
remain constant during each transmission block and change
4independently from one block to another2. The information
source rectifies the RF signals received from the EAPs and
uses the harvested energy to transmit its information. The time
duration of every transmission block is normalized to one. So
we use “energy” and “power” interchangeably hereafter. The
amount of energy harvested by the information source during
one transmission block can be expressed as
Es = η
N∑
m=1
pmGm,s, (1)
where 0 < η < 1 is the energy harvesting efficiency, pm is
the charging power of the mth EAP, and Gm,s is the channel
power gain between the mth EAP and the information source.
Note that the noise is ignored in (1) since it is practically
negligible at the energy receiver.
The harvest-use protocol is considered in this paper [32].
More specifically, the information source will use the har-
vested energy to perform instantaneous information transmis-
sion to the DAP. We consider a battery-free design which
indicates that the sensor only has a storage device like su-
percapacitor to hold the harvested energy for a short period of
time, e.g., among its scheduled transmission block. Hence the
sensor exhausts all the harvested energy in each transmission
block, so the sensor’s energy storage device is emptied at
the beginning of the transmission block. This battery-free
design can reduce the complexity and costs of the sensors,
which is particularly suitable for the considered IoT sensing
applications and has been adopted by other applications [33],
[34]. The transmit power of the information source is thus
given by
Ps = Es. (2)
Then, the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the DAP is
given by
β =
psGa,s
N0
, (3)
where N0 is the noise power at the DAP, and Ga,s is the
channel power gain from the information source to the DAP.
Note that the time duration for each transmission block is nor-
malized as one, such that the channel capacity and throughput
can be used interchangeably. Hence the achievable throughput
(bps) from the information source to the DAP can be expressed
by
RSD = W log2(1 + β)
= W log2
(
1 +
ηGa,s
N0
N∑
m=1
pmGm,s
)
,
(4)
where W is the bandwidth. We define the received signal
power at the active sensor contributed by the mth EAP3 as
2Pilots are broadcasted by the active sensor to allow the DAP and EAPs
to estimate the channels. So the DAP is aware of the channel gain from the
DAP to the sensor and each EAP is aware of the channel gain from this EAP
to the sensor. But the DAP generally is not aware of the channel gains from
the EAPs to the active sensor. The energy consumption of channel estimation
is ignored.
3Note that the received power contributed by each EAP is assumed to
be distinguishable by considering that the EAPs work in disjoint narrow
bandwidth.
qm = pmGm,s, and set γ = ηGa,s/N0 for notation simplicity.
We can thus simplify (4) as
RSD = W log2
(
1 + γ
N∑
m=1
qm
)
. (5)
As we mentioned before, the EAPs considered in the system
belong to different operators and act strategically, so they
would not help the DAP voluntarily. To address this issue, the
DAP needs to provide rewards to motive the EAPs to charge its
sensors. In this paper, we mainly focus on monetary rewards as
the incentive between operators. Other forms of rewards, such
as physical resources (e.g., spectrum), or free offloading data
between operator can also be used. To efficiently exploit the
EAPs to achieve a good throughput, the following questions
need to be answered in asymmetric information: Which EAPs
the DAP should hire, how much energy should be requested
from the hired EAPs, and how many rewards should be given
to the hired EAPs?
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS WITH ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
To answer the above questions in the practical scenario
with asymmetric information, we first model the strategic
interactions between the DAP and EAPs as a Stackelberg
game. We will first re-design and re-analyze the existing
Stackelberg game into the considered scenario by defining
and optimizing expected utility of the DAP. In economic
theories, contract theory is a powerful tool to design incentive
mechanism in information asymmetry. As such, we will then
reformulate the incentive mechanism problem into an optimal
contract design problem.
A. Stackelberg Game with Asymmetric Information
In this part, we will first explore how to design a Stack-
elberg game to model the interactions between the DAP and
the EAPs, and then derive the optimal energy prices under
asymmetric information. In the proposed Stackelberg game
with asymmetric information, the DAP provides rewards to the
EAPs for charging its sensors. The DAP is the leader of the
formulated Stackelberg game, which imposes energy prices for
the EAPs. The DAP optimizes the energy prices to maximize
its expected utility function defined as the difference between
the benefits obtained from the achievable throughput and its
total payment to the EAPs. The EAPs are the followers which
optimize their utility functions defined as the payment received
from the DAP minus its energy cost.
1) Stackelberg Game Formulation: The channel conditions
and energy costs of EAPs are different, so the efficiencies
of EAPs to charge the sensor are distinct. To fully exploit
the potential of the EAPs, a discriminative pricing strategy
is considered, i.e., the DAP can impose different prices of
per unit energy harvested from different EAPs. Let q =
[q1, q2, . . . , qN ]
T as the vector of the active sensor’s received
power from EAPs, with qm denoting the received power from
the mth EAP, and let λ = [λ1, λ2, . . . , λN ]
T as the vector of
prices per unit energy harvested from EAPs, with λm ≥ 0
5denoting the price per unit energy harvested from the mth
EAP. The total payment of the DAP to the EAPs is
Λ(λ,q) =
N∑
m=1
λmqm, (6)
where qm is the received energy frommth EAP. Since the aim
of the DAP is to achieve higher throughput at the cost of less
rewards to the EAPs, the utility function of the DAP can be
defined as
USDAP (λ,q) = RSD − cΛ(λ,q). (7)
where RSD is the achievable throughput defined in (4) and (5),
c is the unit cost of the DAP, which is normalized as c = 1
without loss of generality hereafter.
Each EAP is modeled as a follower which would like to
maximize its individual profit, the utility of which is defined
as
USk (λk, qk) = λkqk − Ck(pk), (8)
where pk = qk/Gk,s is the transmit power of the kth EAP,
and Ck(·) is used to model the energy cost of the kth EAP,
given by
Ck(x) = akx
2, (9)
where ak > 0 is the energy cost coefficient. Note that the
above quadratic function has been widely adopted in the
energy trading market to model the energy cost [35]. The
utility function of the kth EAP becomes
USk (λk, qk) = λkqk −
ak
G2k,s
q2k, (10)
Since the DAP is not aware of each EAP’s exact energy
cost coefficient and channel gain, it can sort EAPs into some
discrete types and use the statistical distributions of the types
of EAPs from historical data to optimize the expected utility
of the DAP. Specifically, we define the type of the kth EAP
as
θk :=
G2k,s
ak
, (11)
which suggests that the larger the channel gain Gk,s between
the EAP and the information source, and/or the lower the unit
energy cost coefficient ak, the higher the type of the EAP.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are totally K
types of EAPs with θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θK . In this definition,
the higher type EAP has better channel quality and/or lower
energy cost coefficient. Note that since ak > 0 and Gk,s > 0,
θ > 0 holds. Using (11), the EAP’s utility can be rewritten as
USk (λk, qk) = λkqk −
q2k
θk
. (12)
Assume there are Nk EAPs belonging to the kth type, we thus
have
∑K
k=1Nk = N . We then can rewrite the DAP’s utility
according to the types of EAPs as
USDAP (λk, qk) = W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
Nkqk
)
−
K∑
k=1
Nkλkqk.
(13)
In this section, we consider a scenario with strong informa-
tion asymmetry. In such a scenario, the DAP is only aware
of the total number of EAPs (i.e., N ) and the distribution
of each type. But it does not know each EAP’s private
type and thus it does not know the exact number of EAPs
belonging to each type k (i.e., Nk). As such, the DAP needs
to optimize its expected utility over the possibilities of all
possible combinations of Nk. The expected utility of the DAP
with N EAPs is given by
E{USDAP (λ,q)} =
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−
∑K−2
i=0
ni∑
nK−1=0{
Φn1,...,nK
[
W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkqk
)
−
K∑
k=1
nkλkqk
]}
,
(14)
where nK = N −
∑K−1
i=0 ni is known after giving
n1, n2, . . . , nK−1 since the DAP knows the total number
N of EAPs, and Φn1,...,nK is the probability of a certain
combination of the number of EAPs belonging to each type
(i.e., Nk, {k = 1, 2, . . . ,K}). We assume that all types are
uniformly distributed. The probability of one EAP belonging
to each type is the same, which is 1/K . In this case, Φn1,...,nK
can be calculated as
Φn1,...,nK = Pr (N1 = n1, N2 = n2, . . . , Nk = nk)
=
N !
n1!n2! . . . nK !KN
(15)
Since the DAP is not aware of the EAPs’ private infor-
mation, it can only optimize the expectation of DAP’s utility
function by using the statistical knowledge of the EAP’s
private information. So the optimization problem for the DAP
or the leader-level game can be formulated as
(P4.1) : max
λ
E{USDAP (λ,q)}
s.t. λ ≥ 0
(16)
Accordingly, the optimization problem for the EAP with kth
type or the follower-level game can be formulated as
(P4.2) : max
qk
USk (λk, qk)
s.t. qk ≥ 0
(17)
Note that although the DAP does not know the EAP’s exact
type, it knows the type set of EAPs.
The Stackelberg game for the considered system has been
formulated by combining problems (P4.1) and (P4.2). In this
game, the DAP is the leader who aims to solve problem
(P4.1), while the EAPs are the followers who aim to solve
their individual problem (P4.2). Once a game is formulated,
the subsequent task is to find its equilibrium point(s). For the
solution of the formulated game, the most well-known concept
is the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), which can be formally
defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Stackelberg equilibrium (SE)). We use λ∗ =
[λ∗1, λ
∗
2, . . . , λ
∗
N ]
T and q∗ = [q∗1 , q
∗
2 , . . . , q
∗
N ]
T to denote the
solutions of problems (P4.1) and (P4.2), respectively. Then,
(λ∗, q∗) is a SE of the formulated game if the following
conditions are satisfied
USDAP (λ
∗, q∗) ≥ USDAP (λ,q
∗) , (18)
6USm (q
∗
m, λ
∗
m) ≥ U
S
m (qm, λ
∗
m) , (19)
for all λ ≥ 0 and q ≥ 0.
2) Analysis of the Proposed Game: In this part, we will
analyze the SE of the proposed Stackelberg game with asym-
metric information.
It can be observed from (10) that for given values of λk, the
utility function of the the EAP with the kth type is a quadratic
function of its contributed power qk to the active sensor and
the constraint is affine, which indicates that the problem (P4.2)
is a convex optimization problem. Thus, it is straightforward
to obtain its optimal solution given in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For given values of λk, the optimal q
∗
k of the EAP
with kth type for problem (P4.2) is given by
q∗k =
θkλk
2
. (20)
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows by noting that the ob-
jective function of problem (P4.2) given in (17) is a quadratic
function in terms of qk.
It can be observed from Lemma 1 that for the same energy
price, an EAP with better channel gain and/or less energy cost
would like to contribute more power to the sensors.
Then we replace qk with q
∗
k in problem (P4.1), the opti-
mization problem at the DAP side can be expressed as
(P4.3) : max
λ
E{USDAP (λ,q
∗)}
s.t. λ ≥ 0
(21)
where E{USDAP (λ,q
∗)} is given by
E{USDAP (λ,q
∗)} =
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−
∑K−2
i=0
ni∑
nK−1=0{
Φn1,...,nK
[
W log2
(
1 +
γ
2
K∑
k=1
nkθkλk
)
−
1
2
K∑
k=1
nkθkλ
2
k
]}
,
(22)
where Φn1,...,nK is given in (15).
We can observe that problem (P4.3) is a concave function in
terms of vector λ. This is because each term in the summation
is composed by a logarithm function (concave) and quadratic
functions (concave), and the summation of concave functions
are still a concave function. Moreover, the constraint is affine.
Problem (P4.3) is then a convex optimization problem. So
we can numerically solve the system of equations given by
the KKT conditions to get the solution of problem (P4.3).
According the KKT conditions, we can also get some insight
about the structure of the solution and thus have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution to problem (P4.3) have
the following structure:
λ∗1 = λ
∗
2 = · · · = λ
∗
N . (23)
Proof. See Appendix A.
We surprisingly find that the optimal energy prices for
different EAPs are the same, even if we impose discrimina-
tive prices for different EAPs in the original design of the
Stackelberg game. This is because the energy price of unit
received power is used in our pricing scheme. The DAP has no
motivation to treat the received power from EAPs differently,
so a unified pricing per unit received power is achieved.
Lack of complete information, the performance of the
Stackelberg game with asymmetric information is worse than
that with complete information. Note that in the considered
scenario, there are N EAPs in the market. In each channel
realization, each EAP in the market selects one EAP type
from a EAP type set randomly. In each channel realization,
the Stackelberg game under complete information can adapt
to the instantaneous combination of EAP types and calculate
an optimal price for each instantaneous combination of EAP
types by optimizing the instantaneous utility function. While
the Stackelberg game under asymmetric information cannot
adapt to instantaneous combination of EAP types, since it can
only calculate a single price for all possible combinations of
EAP types. Therefore, the reason that Stackelberg game under
asymmetric information is worse than Stackelberg game under
complete information is that it fails to adapt to the change of
the instantaneous combinations of EAP types, i.e., the change
of wireless channel conditions. This deduction will be verified
later in the simulation part.
B. Optimal Contract with Asymmetric Information
As we mentioned above, the performance of the Stackelberg
game is degraded under asymmetric information. To improve
the performance under asymmetric information, the DAP
could design and offer a contract to effectively motivate the
EAPs to charge its sensors. Note that in Stackelberg game, the
EAP has the freedom to optimize its own utility by choosing
any amount of received signal power at the active sensor when
the DAP imposes some given energy price. Different from
Stackelberg game, limited options are allowed for EAPs to
select in contract theory. Specifically, a group of energy-reward
pairs (referred to as contract items) are designed. A contract
consisting of a group of contract items is provided to the
EAPs. The EAPs will choose a contract item at its discretion
to maximize its benefit. By properly designing the contract
item, the DAP can induce the EAP to expose its type by its
selection of the contract item and thus relieve the information
asymmetry.
In the following, we will formulate the optimal contract,
characterize its feasibility conditions and provide optimal
solution for the formulated contract.
1) Contract Formulation: In this part, we will formulate
a contract for the RF energy trading between the DAP and
EAPs, characterize its feasibility conditions, and derive the
optimal contract subject to the feasibility conditions.
A contract including a series of energy-reward pairs (qk, pik)
is designed to maximize the expectation of the DAP’s utility.
For the kth type EAP, qk is the received power contributed
by kth EAP and pik is the reward paid to the kth EAP as the
incentive for the corresponding contribution.
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according to contract items. The DAP’s utility function is thus
given by
UCDAP (pi,q) = W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
Nkqk
)
−
K∑
k=1
Nkpik, (24)
where pi = [pi1, pi2, . . . , piK ]
T is the reward paid by the DAP
to the EAP with the kth type for its corresponding contribution
q = [q1, q2, . . . , qK ]
T . Similar to (14), the expectation of
UCDAP (pi,q) can be represented as
E{UCDAP (pi,q)} =
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−
∑K−2
i=0
ni∑
nK−1=0{
Φn1,...,nK
[
W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkqk
)
−
K∑
k=1
nkpik
]}
,
(25)
where nK = N −
∑K−1
i=0 ni is known after giving
n1, n2, . . . , nK−1 since the DAP knows the total number
N of EAPs, and Φn1,...,nK is the probability of a certain
combination of the number of EAPs belonging to each type
(i.e.,Nk, {k = 1, 2, . . . ,K}), which is given by (15). And then
the utility function of the EAP with the kth type is rewritten
as
UCk (pik, qk) = pik −
q2k
θk
. (26)
The social welfare is defined as the summation of the utilities
of the DAP and all N EAPs, given by
Γ(pi,q) = UCDAP (pi,q) +
K∑
k=1
NkU
C
k (pik, qk)
= W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
Nkqk
)
−
K∑
k=1
Nkq
2
k
θk
.
(27)
It can be seen that the internal transfers, i.e., rewards, are
cancelled in the social welfare, which is consistent with
the aim to maximize the efficiency of the whole system,
i.e., achieving more throughput at the cost of less energy
consumptions.
Next, we will figure out the feasibility conditions. In our
design, to encourage the EAPs to participate in the charging
process and ensure that each EAP only chooses the contract
item designed for its type, the following individual rationality
(IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints should be
satisfied [21].
Definition 2 (Individual Rationality (IR)). The contract item
that an EAP chooses should ensure a nonnegative utility, i.e.,
UCk (pik, qk) = pik −
q2k
θk
≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (28)
Definition 3 (Incentive Compatibility (IC)). An EAP of any
type k prefers to choose the contract item (qk, pik) designed
for its type, instead of any other contract item (qj , pij), ∀j ∈
{1, . . . ,K} and j 6= k, given by
pik −
q2k
θk
≥ pij −
q2j
θk
, ∀k, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (29)
The IR condition requires that the received reward of each
EAP should compensate the cost of its consumed energy when
it participates in the energy trading. If Uk ≤ 0, the EAP will
choose not to charge the information source for the DAP.
We define this case as (qk = 0, pik = 0). The IC condition
ensures that each EAP automatically selects the contract item
designed for its corresponding type. The type of each EAP
is thus revealed to the DAP, which is called “self-reveal”. If
a contract satisfies the IR and IC constraints, we refer to the
contract as a feasible contract.
Following the idea of contract theory [21], the DAP aims at
maximizing its expected utility subjecting to the constraints of
IR and IC given in (28) and (29). Thus, the optimal contract
is the solution to the following optimization problem
(P4.4) : max
(pi,q)
E{UCDAP (pi,q)}
s.t. pik −
q2k
θk
≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
pik −
q2k
θk
≥ pij −
q2j
θk
, ∀k, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
qk ≥ 0, pik ≥ 0, θk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
(30)
The first two constraints correspond to IR and IC, respectively.
Note that the EAP will reveal its private type truthfully
with the IR and IC constraints. Specifically, the IR condition
ensures the EAP’s participation and the IC condition ensures
that each EAP selects the contract item designed for its
corresponding type to gain highest payoff.
2) Constraint Reduction: There are K IR constraints and
K(K − 1) IC constraints in (30), which are non-convex and
couple different EAPs together. It is hard to solve (30) directly
due to the complicated constraints. Motivated by this, in the
subsection we first reduce the constraints of (30) and transform
it.
We first realize that the following necessary conditions can
be derived from the IR and IC constraints.
Lemma 2. For any feasible contract, pii > pij if and only if
qi > qj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 2 shows that the EAP contributing more received
power at the information source will receive more reward.
Lemma 3. For any feasible contract, pii = pij if and only if
qi = qj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Lemma 3 can be proved by using similar procedures as
Lemma 2, which is omitted for brevity. Lemma 3 indicates
that the EAPs providing the same received power will get the
same amount of reward.
Lemma 4. For any feasible contract, if θi > θj , then pii > pij ,
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 3 shows that a higher type EAP should be given
more reward. Together with Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it can
be duduced that a higher type EAP also contributes more
8energy to the information source. We define this feature as
monotonicity.
Definition 4 (Monotonicity). If θi ≥ θj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
and then pii ≥ pij .
Based on the above analysis, we can now use the IC
condition to reduce the IR constraints and have the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. With the IC condition, the IR constraints can be
reduced as
pi1 −
q21
θ1
≥ 0. (31)
Proof. See Appendix D.
We can also reduce the IC constraints and attain the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 6. With monotonicity, the IC condition can be reduced
as the local downward incentive compatibility (LDIC), given
by
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi
, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, (32)
and the local upward incentive compatibility (LUIC), given by
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pii+1 −
q2i+1
θi
, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, (33)
Proof. See Appendix E.
By using the reduced IR and IC constraints, the optimization
problem (30) can be transformed as
(P4.5) : max
(pi,q)
E{UCDAP (pi,q)}
s.t. pi1 −
q21
2θ1
≥ 0,
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi
, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . ,K},
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pii+1 −
q2i+1
θi
, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1},
piK ≥ piK−1 ≥ · · · ≥ pi1,
qk ≥ 0, pik ≥ 0, θk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
(34)
The LDIC and the LUIC in (34) can be combined as shown
in Lemma 8.
Lemma 7. Since the optimization objective function is an in-
creasing function of qk and a decreasing function of pik, ∀k ∈
{1, . . . ,K}, the above optimal problem can be further simpli-
fied as
(P4.6) : max
(pi,q)
E{UCDAP (pi,q)}
s.t. pi1 −
q21
θ1
= 0,
pik −
q2k
θk
= pik−1 −
q2k−1
θk
, ∀k ∈ {2, . . . ,K},
piK ≥ piK−1 ≥ · · · ≥ pi1,
qk ≥ 0, pik ≥ 0, θk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
(35)
Proof. See Appendix F.
3) Solution to Optimal Contract: We now solve the opti-
mization problem (35) to attain the optimal contract in the
subsequent way: a standard method is first applied to resolve
the relaxed problem without monotonicity and the solution is
then verified to satisfy the condition of the monotonicity. By
iterating the first and second constraints in (35), we have
pik =
q21
θ1
+
k∑
n=2
q2n − q
2
n−1
θn
=
1
θk
q2k +
k∑
n=2
(
1
θn−1
−
1
θn
)
q2n−1,
(36)
where ∀k ∈ {2, . . . ,K}. Substitute (36) into E{UCDAP (pi,q)},
and all pik, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} are removed from the optimiza-
tion problem (35), which becomes
max
q
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−
∑K−2
i=0
ni∑
nK−1=0
Φn1,...,nK
×
[
W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkqk
)
−
K−1∑
k=1
(
1
θk
K∑
i=k
ni −
1
θk+1
K∑
i=k+1
ni
)
q2k −
nK
θK
q2K
]
,
s.t. qk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
(37)
Note that (37) is composed of logarithmic functions and
quadratic functions, both of which are concave functions. And
the positive summation of all these concave function is still a
concave function. Besides, the constraint set is a convex set.
So we can leverage standard convex optimization tools in [36]
to solve it to get qk, and then pik can be calculated by (36).
Moreover, monotonicity is met automatically when the type is
uniformly distributed [21]. So far, we have derived the optimal
contract (qk, pik), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, which can maximize the
utility of the DAP and satisfy the constraints of IR and IC.
C. Practical Implementation
To implement the proposed approach in a practical radio
frequency energy harvesting-based IoT system. The following
steps should be followed.
First, the DAP needs to collect the information it requires
by the computation of the optimal contract. The active sensor
will broadcast pilots to allow the DAP and EAPs to estimate
the channels such that the DAP is aware of the channel gain
from the DAP to the sensor. From historical data, the DAP
can obtain empirical values of the energy harvesting efficiency
factor and noise power, and thus it can attain the value of
parameter γ. With the known values of other public system
parameters including the channel bandwidth, the user number,
and the set of EAP types, the DAP can calculate the optimal
contract.
Next, the DAP will broadcast the optimal contract to the
candidate EAPs via the corresponding backhauls. By evaluat-
ing the contract, the EAPs will decide whether to participate
in the cooperation. If it decides to participate in the current
energy trading, it will send a feedback to the DAP. After the
9DAP received the feedback, it will sign a contract with the
EAP.
Finally, after the contracts are signed, the EAPs will perform
the contracts by establishing an energy transfer link towards
the active sensor and charge it according to the agreed transmit
power. When the DAP detects that the EAPs have fulfilled its
contractual obligation, the DAP will pay the EAP with agreed
amount of rewards via the backhaul connecting the operators.
V. BENCHMARK SCHEMES WITH COMPLETE
INFORMATION
To investigate the impacts from information scenarios and
compare the proposed schemes with the existing schemes un-
der complete information, we first extend existing Stackelberg
game from unified pricing strategy into discriminative pricing
strategy. And then we present the centralized optimization
scheme under complete information as the reference for the
proposed incentive mechanisms.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
To fully exploit the potentials of EAPs with distinct channel
conditions and energy costs, a discriminative pricing strategy
is considered, i.e., the DAP can impose different prices of per
unit energy harvested from different EAPs. The utility function
of the DAP can be rewritten as
USDAP (λ,q) = RSD −
N∑
m=1
λmqm. (38)
where q = [q1, q2, . . . , qN ]
T is the vector of the active sensor’s
received power from EAPs, with qm denoting the received
power from the mth EAP, λ = [λ1, λ2, . . . , λN ]
T is the vector
of prices per unit energy harvested from EAPs, with λm ≥ 0
denoting the price per unit energy harvested from m EAP, and
RSD is the achievable throughput defined in (4) and (5). The
optimization problem for the DAP or the leader-level game
can be formulated as
(P5.1) : max
λ
USDAP (λ,q)
s.t. λ ≥ 0
(39)
Note that the optimization problem (P5.1) is different from
(P4.1) under asymmetric information, the instantaneous utility
of the DAP is optimized here, instead of expected utility of
the DAP in asymmetric information.
Each EAP is modeled as a follower which would like to
maximize its individual profit, the utility of which is rewritten
as
USm(λm, qm) = λmqm −
am
G2m,s
q2m, (40)
where am > 0 and Gm,s are the energy cost coefficient
and channel gain of the mth EAP, respectively. Thus, the
optimization problem for the EAP m or the follower-level
game is given by
(P5.2) : max
qm
USm(λm, qm)
s.t. qm ≥ 0
(41)
B. Analysis of the Formulated Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we will derive the SE of the formulated
game by analyzing the optimal strategies for the DAP and
EAPs to maximize their own utility functions. A closed-
form solution is derived by using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions.
First, the optimal q∗m of the mth EAP is similar to that in
(20), which is given by the following Lemma:
Lemma 8. For given λm, the optimal solution for problem
(P5.2) is given by
q∗m =
G2m,sλm
2am
. (42)
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows by noting that the
objective function of problem (P5.2) given in (41) is a concave
function in terms of qm.
It can be observed from Lemma 8 that for the same energy
price, an EAP with better channel gain and/or less energy cost
would like to contribute more power to the active sensor.
Subsequently, we need to solve problem (P5.1) by replacing
qm with q
∗
m given in (42). The optimization problem at the
DAP side can be expressed as
(P5.3) : max
λ
USDAP (λ,q
∗)
s.t. λ ≥ 0
(43)
where USDAP (λ,q
∗) is given by
USDAP (λ,q
∗) =W log2
(
1 + γ
N∑
m=1
G2m,s
2am
λm
)
−
N∑
m=1
G2m,s
2am
λ2m.
(44)
We can observe that problem (P5.3) is a concave function
in terms of vector λ since the former part in (44) is a
logarithm function (concave) and the latter parts in (44) are the
summation of quadratic functions (concave), and the constraint
is affine. So problem (P5.3) is a convex optimization problem.
By using KKT conditions to solve problem (P5.3), the closed-
form solution for λ is derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal solution to problem (P5.3) is given
by
λ∗1 = λ
∗
2 = · · · = λ
∗
N =
√
log2(e)γ
2WΘ+ 1− 1
γΘ
, (45)
where e is the base of the natural logarithm, Θ is given by
Θ =
N∑
m=1
G2m,s
am
. (46)
Proof. See Appendix G.
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal prices for the Stackel-
berg game with complete information are the same. This result
is consistent with that of the Stackelberg game with asym-
metric information. As we explained before, this is because
the received power price is used in the Stackelberg games
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with complete and asymmetric information. The DAP has no
motivation to treat the received power from EAPs differently.
Note that the Stackelberg game under complete information
can calculate an optimal price for each instantaneous channel
realization and equivalently the combination of EAPs’ types.
As such, it can adapt to the change of channel conditions.
As a comparison, the Stackelberg game under asymmetric
information can only calculate a single price no matter of
the change of the channel conditions, i.e., the change of the
combinations of the EAPs’ types.
C. Centralized Optimization
In this part, the performance of centralized optimization
scheme, i.e., the optimal contract with complete information,
where the DAP knows exactly the types of the EAPs, is
presented. The centralized optimization problem is given as
follows.
(P5.4) : max
(pi,q)
E{UCDAP (pi,q)}
s.t. pik −
q2k
θk
≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
(47)
where E{UCDAP (pi,q)} is given in (25).
Since the DAP knows exactly the types of the EAPs, the
optimal prices are given by
pi∗k =
q2k
θk
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} (48)
We substitute pik in (47) with pi
∗
k and get
(P5.5) : max
q
E{UCDAP (pi
∗, q)}
s.t. q ≥ 0
(49)
where E{UCDAP (pi
∗, q)} is given by
E{UCDAP (pi
∗, q)} =
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−
∑K−2
i=0
ni∑
nK−1=0{
Φn1,...,nK
[
W log2
(
1 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkqk
)
−
K∑
k=1
nk
q2k
θk
]}
.
(50)
Note that (50) is exactly the expectation of the social
welfare, which is defined in (27). Although we originally
optimize the utility function of the DAP in problem (P5.4),
it is consistent with the optimization of the social welfare,
which is similar case in the design of contract theory as we
mentioned before.
It can also be observed that problem (P5.5) is a convex opti-
mization problem. This is because each term in the summation
is composed a logarithm function (concave) and quadratic
functions (concave), the summation of concave functions are
still a concave function, and the constraint is affine. We can
get the solution of problem (P5.5) by solving the system of
equations given by KKT conditions, which is omitted here as
it is similar to that in Appendix A.
TABLE I: System Settings
Parameters Values
Energy harvesting efficiency η 0.5
Bandwidth W 1MHz
Energy cost coefficient am [0.1,1]
dm,s [5m,10m]
da,s [15m,25m]
Path-loss coefficient α 2
Power attenuation at reference distance of 1m 30dB
Noise power N0 10−8mW
            Contract item for a certain type EAP
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Fig. 2: Utilities of EAPs with type 3, type 6 and type 9 as
functions of contract items designed for all kinds of EAPs
from type 1 to type 10. We set N = 5 and K = 10.
VI. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we first evaluate the feasibility of the
proposed contract, and then compare the performance of the
proposed incentive mechanisms. The performance of central-
ized optimization scheme is also simulated as the upper bound.
The main system parameters are shown in Table I. Since
θ = G2m,s/am and γ = ηGa,s/N0, the practical ranges of θ
and γ can be determined by the parameters shown in Table I. In
the simulations, K types of EAPs are first generated randomly
and used as the set of EAP types. Then each of N EAPs in
the market will choose one type from the set of EAP types
uniformly, and thus the DAP’s type θ is uniformly distributed.
The unit of achievable throughput is set as Mbps.
To verify the feasibility (i.e., IR and IC) of the proposed
scheme under information asymmetry, the utilities of EAPs
with type 3, type 6 and type 9 are plotted in Fig. 2 as
functions of all contract items (qk, pik), k ∈ 1, 2, . . . ,K . We
can see from Fig. 2 that each of the utility achieves its peak
value only when it chooses the contract item designed for its
corresponding type, which indicates that the IC constraint is
satisfied. For example, for the type 6 EAP, its utility achieves
the peak value only when it selects the contract item (q6, pi6),
which is exactly designed for its type. If the type 6 EAP selects
any other contract item (qk, pik), k ∈ 1, 2, . . . ,K and k 6= 6,
its utility will reduce. Moreover, when each of above type
EAPs (i.e., type 3, type 6 and type 9) chooses the contract
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Fig. 4: Normalized social welfare as a function of γ. We set
N = 2 and K = 5.
item designed for its corresponding type, the utilities are
nonnegative. Note that similar phenomenon can be observed
for all other types of EAPs when they select the contract item
designed for their corresponding types, which are not shown
in Fig. 2 for brevity. In this sense, the IR condition is satisfied.
It can be concluded that utilizing the proposed scheme, EAPs
will automatically reveal its type to the DAP after selecting
the contract item. This means that using the proposed scheme,
the DAP can capture the EAPs’ private information (i.e., its
type), and thus effectively address the problem of information
asymmetry.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes, we
compare the social welfare of the contract, Stackelberg games
and the upper bound. Fig. 3 plots the social welfare of these
schemes as a function of γ. It can be observed from Fig.
3 that the utilities achieved by all schemes increase with
γ. This is because with the same
∑N
m=1 qm, the larger the
value of γ, the larger the achievable throughput Rsa (refer
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Fig. 5: Social welfare as a function of N . We set K = 2,
γ = 2.2 and K = 2, 3, . . . , 10.
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Fig. 6: Normalized social welfare as a function of N . We set
K = 2, γ = 2.2 and N = 2, 3, . . . , 10.
to (5)), and thus larger social welfare (refer to (27)). The
performance of the optimal scheme with complete information
providing the best performance serving as the upper bound.
The performance of contract scheme is generally better than
that of two Stackelberg games. This is because in contract
theory, the EAPs have limited contract items to choose from
and thus by using the contract theory, the DAP extracts more
benefits from the EAPs and leave less surplus for the EAPs.
However, in Stackelberg games, the EAPs have the freedom
to optimize its individual utility function and thus can reserve
more surplus. So the performance of the Stackelberg games are
inferior than that of the contract scheme. We can also observe
that the Stackelberg game with asymmetric information is
inferior than that with complete information. This is because
without complete information, the Stackelberg game fails to
adapt to the change of the channel, and thus the performance
becomes worse.
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Fig. 4 shows the normalized social welfare as a function of
γ, where social welfare of the contract and Stackelberg games
are normalized by the upper bound. It can be seen in Fig. 4
that when γ is small, the social welfare of contract can initially
achieve more than 85% of that of the centralized optimization
scheme with complete information, and gradually approach to
it with the increasing of γ. This demonstrates that the proposed
incentive mechanism can effectively mitigate the effects of
information asymmetry by leveraging contract theory. While
the performance of the Stackelberg game with complete in-
formation is generally less than 75% of that of the optimal
scheme with complete information. Moreover, the performance
of the Stackelberg game with asymmetric information is even
worse, which is generally less than 50% of that of the optimal
scheme with complete information. The above results show
that by using the monopoly position in contract theory to
provide limited contract items, the contract can achieve good
performance close to the optimal centralized optimization with
complete information. However, in Stackelberg games, the
DAP grants some freedom for the EAPs to do optimizations,
which are selfish and do not care about social welfare. As
such, its performance in terms of social welfare is degraded.
To explore the impact of total EAP numberN in the market,
we plot the curves of the social welfare and the normalized
social welfare of the contract, Stackelberg games and the upper
bound in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. In Fig. 5, the social welfare of
these schemes is plotted as a function of N . We can observe
from Fig. 5 that the utility functions achieved by all three
schemes of upper bound, contract, Stackelberg with complete
information increase with N . This is because the overall social
welfare increases with the number of EAPs in the market.
The more EAPs in the market, the larger the summation
of utility functions of all the DAP and EAPs. However,
the Stackelberg game under asymmetric information decrease
slightly as N increases. This is because the Stackelberg game
under asymmetric information fails to adapt to the change
of the combinations of the EAPs’ types. As we mentioned
before, it can only calculate one single price for all the
combinations of EAPs’ types. The more EAPs in the market,
the more diverse combinations of the EAPs’ types. As such the
performance of the Stackelberg under asymmetric information
become worse. As a comparison, the Stackelberg game with
complete information can calculate a price targeting a certain
combination of EAPs’ types in the market. So it provides
better performance than that of its asymmetric counterpart.
While the contract leverages its monopoly status in the market
structure to provide a limited group of contract items for
the EAPs to choose from. Therefore, contract theory-based
scheme provides the better performance than that of both
Stackelberg games and close to the performance of the upper
bound.
In Fig. 6, the normalized social welfare of these schemes is
plotted as a function of N , where social welfare of the contract
and Stackelberg games are normalized by the upper bound. It
can be seen in Fig. 6 that when N = 2, the social welfare
of contract can initially gain more than 95% of that of the
centralized optimization scheme with complete information,
and gradually approach to it with the increasing of N . This
proves that the effects of information asymmetry can be
mitigated successfully by leveraging contract theory. While the
Stackelberg game with complete information can only provide
the normalized social welfare of less than 75%. Besides,
the performance of the Stackelberg game with asymmetric
information is even worse, which is generally less than 50%
of that of the optimal scheme with complete information
and decrease significantly with the increasing of N in the
market. This is because the more EAPs in the market, the
more diverse the combinations of EAPs’ types will be. The
Stackelberg game under asymmetric information cannot adapt
to the change of the combinations of EAPs’ types as it can
only calculate a single price for all possible combinations of
EAPs’ types.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed incentive mechanisms under
complete and asymmetric information to unveil the impact
of information asymmetry and market structure. Specifically,
we developed a contract based incentive mechanisms for the
wireless energy trading in radio frequency energy harvesting
(RFEH) based Internet of Things (IoT) systems under asym-
metric information. In the asymmetric information scenario,
a Stackelberg game based scheme is also formulated as a
comparison. In complete information, the existing Stackelberg
game is extended from unified pricing into discriminative
pricing as a comparison. In the simulations, it was shown that
the Stackelberg game degrades significantly without complete
information, and the performance of the contract scheme under
asymmetric information is better than that of the Stackelberg
scheme with complete information. It can be concluded that
the performance of the considered system depends largely on
the market structure (i.e., whether the EAPs are allowed to
optimize their received power at the IoT devices with full
freedom or not) than on the information scenarios (i.e., the
complete or asymmetric information).
In our future work, we could consider both information
asymmetry as well as hidden action. In this scenario, the
DAP is not aware of the private information of EAPs and
it cannot distinguish the actions taken by different EAPs, i.e.,
the received power contributed by different EAPs. Because the
actions of EAPs are hidden from the DAP, some EAPs may get
the reward of the group without paying any efforts, which leads
to the free-rider problem. In this case, another mathematical
tool from the economics, known as the moral hazard in teams,
has a good potential to design effective incentive mechanisms
for this new scenario.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
In this part, we will prove the proposition 1. Because
the problem (P4.3) is a convex optimization problem, KKT
conditions are the sufficient and necessary conditions for the
optimal solution. The KKT conditions of problem (P4.3) are
given as follows.
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The first-order necessary condition are given by

∑
n1,...,nK
Φn1,...,nK

−W log2(e)γn1θ1
2 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkθkλk
+ n1θ1λ1


− µ1 = 0
∑
n1,...,nK
Φn1,...,nK

−W log2(e)γn2θ2
2 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkθkλk
+ n2θ2λ2


− µ2 = 0
...
∑
n1,...,nK
Φn1,...,nK

−W log2(e)γnNθN
2 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkθkλk
+ nNθNλN


− µN = 0
(51)
where θk ≥ 0 are the types of EAPs, µk ≥ 0 are KKT
multipliers, λm ≥ 0 are the prices, and k = 1, 2, . . . ,K . The
complementary slackness condition is given by
µ1λ1 + µ2λ2 + · · ·+ µKλK = 0. (52)
Since µk ≥ 0 and λk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K hold, (52) becomes

µ1λ1 = 0
µ2λ2 = 0
...
µKλK = 0
(53)
To get the optimal solution of the KKT conditions, we need
to solve the equation system consists of (51) and (53) in terms
of µk ≥ 0 and λk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , N , which is a system of
quadratic equations. Now we will discuss the combinations of
active or inactive constraints in KKT condition. Let first test
if µ1 = µ2 = · · · = µK = 0 leads to a valid solution. By
substitute µ1, µ2, . . . , µK with µ1 = µ2 = · · · = µK = 0 in
(51), we have 

λ1∆ =W log2(e)γΩ(λ)
λ2∆ =W log2(e)γΩ(λ)
...
λK∆ = W log2(e)γΩ(λ)
(54)
where ∆ is given by
∆ =
∑
n1,...,nK
Φn1,...,nK = 1, (55)
and Ω(λ), λ = [λ1, λ2, . . . , λK ]
T
is given by
Ω(λ) =
∑
n1,...,nK
Φn1,...,nK
2 + γ
K∑
k=1
nkθkλk
. (56)
The above system of equations in (54) can be solved
numerically. Note that the right term of each equation in (54)
are the same, so we can conclude that
λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λK = W log2(e)γΩ(λ). (57)
Because problem (P4.3) is a convex optimization problem,
we can conclude that this solution given by KKT conditions
is the solution of original optimization problem.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is conducted in two parts. First, we prove if qi >
qj , then pii > pij . Due to the IC constraints in (30), we have
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pij −
q2j
θi
, (58)
and equivalently,
θi(pii − pij) ≥ q
2
i − q
2
j = (qi + qj)(qi − qj). (59)
Since qi > qj , we have
θi(pii − pij) ≥ q
2
i − q
2
j = (qi + qj)(qi − qj) > 0, (60)
and thus pii > pij .
Next we prove if pii > pij , then qi > qj . Due to the IC
constraints in (30), we have
pij −
q2j
θj
≥ pii −
q2i
θj
, (61)
and equivalently,
(qi + qj)(qi − qj) = q
2
i − q
2
j ≥ θi(pii − pij). (62)
Since pii > pij , then we have
(qi + qj)(qi − qj) = q
2
i − q
2
j ≥ θi(pii − pij) > 0, (63)
and thus qi > qj . This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that there exists
pii < pij when θi > θj . We have
(pii − pij)(θi − θj) < 0. (64)
Due to the IC constraints, we also have
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pij −
q2j
θi
, (65)
and
pij −
q2j
θj
≥ pii −
q2i
θj
. (66)
Combine (65) and (66), we have
(pii − pij)(θi − θj) ≥ 0, (67)
which is in contradiction with (64). So if θi > θj , then pii >
pij .
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D. Proof of Lemma 5
Due to the IC condition, ∀k ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, we have
pik −
q2k
θk
≥ pi1 −
q21
θk
. (68)
Since we have defined that θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θK , we also have
pi1 −
q21
θk
≥ pi1 −
q21
θ1
. (69)
Combine (68) and (69), we have
pik −
q2k
θk
≥ pi1 −
q21
θ1
≥ 0. (70)
Note that (70) shows that with the IC condition, if the IR
condition of the EAP with type θ1 holds, the IR condition of
the other K − 1 types will also hold. So the other K − 1 IR
conditions can be bind into the IR condition of the EAP with
type θ1.
E. Proof of Lemma 6
There are K(K − 1) IC constraints in (30), which can be
divided into K(K − 1)/2 downward incentive compatibility
(DIC)4, given by
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pij −
q2j
θi
, ∀i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, i > j, (71)
and K(K−1)/2 upward incentive compatibility (UIC), given
by
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pij −
q2j
θi
, ∀i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, i < j, (72)
Let’s first prove the DIC can be reduced as the LDIC. By
using the LDIC for three continuous types, θi−1 < θi <
θi+1, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}, we have
pii+1 −
q2i+1
θi+1
≥ pii −
q2i
θi+1
, (73)
pii −
q2i
θi
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi
, ∀i. (74)
By applying the monotonicity, i.e., if θi > θj , then pii > pij ,
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we have
(θi+1 − θi)(pii − pii−1) ≥ 0, (75)
θi+1(pii − pii−1) ≥ θi(pii − pii−1), (76)
Combine (74) and (76), we have
θi+1(pii − pii−1) ≥ θi(pii − pii−1) ≥ q
2
i − q
2
i−1. (77)
Equally, (77) becomes
pii −
q2i
θi+1
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi+1
. (78)
Combine (78) and (73), we have
pii+1 −
q2i+1
θi+1
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi+1
. (79)
4Note that K(K − 1)/2 is still an integer. Because K(K − 1) is the
multiplication of two continuous integers, which must be an even number. So
it is divisible by two.
So far, we have proved that type θi+1 will prefer contract item
(qi+1, pii+1) rather than contract item (qi−1, pii−1). By using
(79), it can be extended downward until type θ1, and thus all
DIC holds.
pii+1 −
q2i+1
θi+1
≥ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi+1
≥ . . . ≥ pi1 −
q21
θ1
, ∀i. (80)
So we conclude that with the monotonicity and the LDIC, the
DIC holds. Similarly, we can prove that with the monotonicity
and the LUIC, the UIC holds.
F. Proof of Lemma 7
We will first prove that the LDIC can be simplified as pik−
q2k/θk = pik−1 − q
2
k−1/θk, which together with monotonicity
can ensure the LUIC hold.
For the reduced IR constraint pi1 − q
2
1/θ1 ≥ 0 in (34), the
DAP will lower the pi1 as possible as it can to improve the
optimization objective function E{UDAP }, until pi1−q
2
1/θ1 =
0. As for the LDIC, which is pii−q
2
i /θi ≥ pii−1−q
2
i−1/θi, ∀i ∈
{2, . . . ,K}. Notice that the LDIC will still hold if both pii
and pii−1 are lowered by the same amount. To maximize the
optimization objective function, the DAP will lower all pi − j
as much as possible until pii − q
2
i /θi = pii−1 − q
2
i−1/θi. Note
that this process will not affect on other type’s LDIC. So the
LDIC can be reduced to pii − q
2
i /θi = pii−1 − q
2
i−1/θi, ∀k ∈
{2, . . . ,K}.
Next, we show that if pii − q
2
i /θi = pii−1 − q
2
i−1/θi, ∀k ∈
{2, . . . ,K} and the monotonicity hold, the LUIC holds. Since
we have pii − q
2
i /θi = pii−1 − q
2
i−1/θi, ∀k ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, and
equally it becomes
θi(pii − pii−1) = q
2
i − q
2
i−1. (81)
Because of monotonicity, i.e., if θi ≥ θi−1, then pii ≥ pii−1,
we further have
θi(pii − pii−1) ≥ θi−1(pii − pii−1). (82)
Combine (81) and (82), we have
θi(pii − pii−1) = q
2
i − q
2
i−1 ≥ θi−1(pii − pii−1), (83)
and equally we have
θi−1pii − q
2
i ≤ θi−1pii−1 − q
2
i−1, (84)
pii −
q2i
θi−1
≤ pii−1 −
q2i−1
θi−1
, (85)
which is exactly the LUIC condition. So the LUIC can be
removed from the constraints in (34).
G. Proof of Proposition 2
In this part, we will prove the proposition 2. Since the prob-
lem (P5.3) is a convex optimization problem, KKT conditions
will be the sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimal
solution. To solve problem (P5.3), the KKT conditions are
given as follows.
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The first-order necessary condition are given by

−W log2(e)γθ1
2 + γ
N∑
m=1
θmλm
+ θ1λ1 − µ1 = 0
−W log2(e)γθ2
2 + γ
N∑
m=1
θmλm
+ θ2λ2 − µ2 = 0
...
−W log2(e)γθN
2 + γ
N∑
m=1
θmλm
+ θNλN − µN = 0
(86)
where θm =
G2m,s
am
, µm ≥ 0 are KKT multipliers, and λm ≥
0,m = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The complementary slackness condition is given by
µ1λ1 + µ2λ2 + · · ·+ µNλN = 0. (87)
Since µm ≥ 0 and λm ≥ 0,m = 1, 2, . . . , N hold, (87)
becomes 

µ1λ1 = 0
µ2λ2 = 0
...
µNλN = 0
(88)
To get the optimal solution of the KKT conditions, we need
to solve the equation system consists of (86) and (88) in terms
of µm ≥ 0 and λm ≥ 0,m = 1, 2, . . . , N , which is a system
of quadratic equations.
Now we will discuss the combinations of active or inactive
constraints in KKT condition. Let first test if µ1 = µ2 = · · · =
µN = 0 leads to a valid solution. By substitute µ1, µ2, . . . , µN
with µ1 = µ2 = · · · = µN = 0 in (86), we have

λ1
(
2 + γ
N∑
m=1
θmλm
)
= W log2(e)γ
λ2
(
2 + γ
N∑
m=1
θmλm
)
= W log2(e)γ
...
λN
(
2 + γ
N∑
m=1
θmλm
)
=W log2(e)γ
(89)
By solving the system of equations of (89), we can get a
solution as given by
λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λN =
√
log2(e)γ
2WΘ+ 1− 1
γΘ
, (90)
where e is the base of the natural logarithm, Θ is given by
Θ =
N∑
m=1
θm. (91)
Because problem (P5.3) is a convex optimization problem,
we can conclude that this solution given by KKT conditions
is the solution of original optimization problem.
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